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of nature, and that the doctrine of "live and let live" is just and safe.

We have seen the world freed from many physical plagues by a patient and wise research in the field of prophylaxis, after having for centuries endured them with patient resignation as divine impositions. What we need now is moral hygienics, beginning with faith in the power of ideas and abandoning our fear of the epithet "idealist," which practical men are wont to throw in our faces with their terrible proofs.

I have come this evening to take my place among you without any sense of humiliation at being called an idealist. What would humiliate me, however, would be a hesitation on my part to proclaim the truth as I conceive it, loyally and honorably. (Applause.)

President MONTAGUE: Ladies and Gentlemen, we are very grateful to His Excellency the Ambassador for his very eloquent and wise remarks.

There was a speaker upon a very interesting topic, "The Maintenance of Peace in Our Western Hemisphere," who was delayed and has just arrived. I will not waste words in presenting him to you, for I am sure that he is well known to all of you—Dr. Leo S. Rowe, Director General of the Pan American Union. (Applause.)

Leo S. Rowe

I feel that I must apologize for having raised in your minds the hope that you would escape me and, after that hope seemed almost at the point of fulfillment, to disappoint you. (Laughter.)

I am glad, however, that I arrived in time to hear at least the greater portion of the address of His Excellency the Chilean Ambassador. It was most fitting that he should speak on this occasion, because there is certainly no other member of the Diplomatic Corps in Washington who has worked more earnestly, more incessantly, and more conscientiously, day in and day out, in the cause of peace. But I think that he has found, as many of us have found, that the greatest obstacle to the peace movement is that people are accustomed to look upon peace as something purely negative, namely, the absence of conflict. Such a view neither stirs the imagination nor spurs to action.

It is because the Pan American Union, since the day of its founding in 1889, to the present time, has emphasized the idea of mutual service that it has been able to set before the world an example of the real meaning of peace and a new standard of international action. To me it is always an inspiring sight to see the representatives of all the Republics of America assembled about the table of the Governing Board, exchanging views and devising means by which the nations of this continent can be of service to one another. Quietly and unostentatiously this work has gone on until today the spirit of Pan American unity has reached a point at which every international question, no matter how difficult and delicate, lends itself to the orderly process of settlement by conference.

We are witnessing today the splendid example that is being set by two great countries of South America—

Chile and Peru—in arranging for a settlement of the problem which has divided them for so many years.

The American Peace Society deserves the gratitude of this nation, because, for a period of nearly a century, it has been teaching and preaching the positive, vital, and constructive view of peace. It has placed before the American people the thought that peace rests, not merely on the elimination of armed conflict, but on the development of international co-operation, the strengthening of mutual service, and that common understanding and good-will which is the best antidote to prejudice and international antagonism.

President MONTAGUE: I beg to associate myself with the members of this Society in thanking the speakers of the evening and the distinguished guests for their presence. I now bid you good evening.

THE QUESTION OF THE ADRIATIC

By GORDON GORDON-SMITH

(NOTE.—It is becoming day by day more evident that Europe looks more and more to the United States for aid in the solution of many of the problems which the World War has brought to the front. The nations do not any longer look for active intervention, but they hope to find in the United States a "guide, philosopher, and friend," whose counsels will carry the more weight that, politically, America has no direct interests on the other side of the Atlantic.

But, in order that the counsels and advice of the United States should carry weight, they must be based on full knowledge of the questions at issue. An unjust decision would tend to perpetuate discord instead of removing it. No better contribution can, therefore, be made to the cause of peace than the education of American public opinion regarding the issues which tend to cause division among the nations.

One of the most important of these is the Adriatic question. In the following pages I have tried to set down for the readers of the "Advocate of Peace through Justice" a *historique* of the question and the various factors which go to make it up.—G. G.-S.)

ONE of the chief difficulties of the reconstruction period which has followed the World War has been the question of territorial distribution. The whole of Central Europe has been thrown into the melting pot and a redistribution of territories and frontiers on a large scale has been undertaken. Two entirely new States have been created, Czechoslovakia and Poland, while two others, Serbia and Rumania, have had their territories immensely increased, their populations being in each case more than tripled.

The entrance into the family of nations of new members of this importance was bound to be of the deepest interest to their neighbors. In some cases the interest was complicated by a certain amount of fear and distrust. Certain questions which had been latent suddenly became acute; others which had not even existed were called into being. Political and economic problems have been created on every side, some of which will test the statesmanship of the men in charge of the destinies of Europe to an extraordinary degree.

One of these problems which I propose to lay before the readers of the "Advocate of Peace through Justice" is the question of the Adriatic. Ever since the armistice this question has been in the forefront of the discussions

of policy and interests between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, popularly known as Yugoslavia. It is a complicated one (or, to speak more correctly, has become a complicated one), and on its just and equitable solution will depend the future relations of Italy and Yugoslavia and perhaps the peace of Europe.

THE OLD ADRIATIC SITUATION

Before the war and up to 1912 the situation in the Adriatic had been a simple one. Italy held the entire western coast of that sea, while the eastern coast was held by Austria-Hungary, Montenegro, and the Ottoman Empire, the latter as owner of the Province of Albania. As Montenegro was a small country, of less than half a million inhabitants, with only one little port, Antivari, it may be eliminated from the list of Adriatic powers. The Ottoman Empire did not make any claim to be a naval power, so that its possession of an Adriatic coastline was internationally of little importance. In fact, the chief interest lay in the question of who would fall heir to the possession of Albania when the moment of the break-up of the Ottoman Empire should arrive. As far as Albania was concerned, this moment came in 1913, when that country, taking advantage of the defeat of Turkey by the Balkan States, proclaimed its independence.

This opened the door to all kinds of competition and intrigues between Austria-Hungary and Italy, each of whom had for years maintained a large number of secret agents on Albanian territory and had carried on an active propaganda among the inhabitants. At the London Conference, in 1913, the usual compromise was arrived at and the country fell neither to Austria nor to Italy, but was given independence under its own king, a German prince, Wilhelm zu Wied, being elected to that position. He was from the beginning so obviously a mere puppet-king that the intrigues within the country went on more actively than ever, and the king was finally forced to leave the country and even do it with a certain amount of precipitation. Essad Pasha, a born Albanian and a former general of the Sultan, then seized power and was ruling the country at the moment of the outbreak of the World War.

CONDITIONS AT OUTBREAK OF WAR

The chief powers in the Adriatic, and in fact the only ones which really played a decisive rôle, were, therefore, Italy and Austria-Hungary, which for over a century had carried on a struggle for supremacy. As far as ports and harbors were concerned, the advantage was all with the latter power. Trieste, Pola, Fiume, the Bocche di Cattaro, Spalato, and Ragusa furnished the Dual Monarchy with a series of splendid harbors, while on the other side of the Adriatic, with the exception of Venice and Brindisi, the Italian ports were of little or no value. The Austrian fleet had its headquarters at Pola and was a constant challenge to Italy's supremacy in the Adriatic.

If Austria's sea power could be broken or eliminated, the Adriatic would become an Italian lake. The main object of Italian diplomacy was, therefore, to secure a paramount position for that kingdom. When, then, after the outbreak of the World War, both groups of belligerents approached Italy with a view to obtain her

support, the question of the Adriatic naturally formed the crux of the negotiations. At the moment of the outbreak of the World War Italy was still a member of the Triple Alliance. The Consulta, however, did not regard the cause of the conflict put forward by the Central Powers as a *casus fœderis* provided for by Italy's treaty with them. The Italian Government, therefore, informed its German and Austrian allies that it intended to remain neutral during the conflict. This declaration the Italian Government made to both groups of belligerents, but without furnishing either of them with any absolute guarantee as to how long or under what circumstances this neutrality would be maintained.

This uncertainty was a source of deep anxiety and embarrassment, both to the Central Powers and the powers of the Entente. Their anxiety was further increased by the fact that there were in Italy two powerful parties (minorities, it is true, but such as had to be reckoned with), the Pro-German Party, under Signor Giolitti, and the War Party, headed by the Independent Socialists, under Signor Mussolini, and the advanced wing of the Liberal Party, which were each trying to influence the policy of the government in favor of its views.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ITALY IN THE WAR

As a consequence it became almost a life or death matter for each of the belligerent groups to get Italy to "come off the fence" for good and come down on its side of the barricade.

Germany knew that it was hopeless to expect Italy to take up arms and fight on the side of the Central Powers; but she hoped to obtain from her a cast-iron treaty of neutrality, such as would relieve the Wilhelmstrasse and the Ballplatz of all anxiety and allow them to shape their policies with the Italian danger entirely eliminated. Prince Bulow, the German Ambassador to the Quirinal, therefore commenced a series of negotiations with this object in view. Then began an era of sordid huckstering which forms one of the most unlovely episodes of the World War. The negotiations between Berlin and Rome were carried on for weeks. They were the more long drawn out as it became increasingly difficult for Prince Bulow to get the Vienna Government to entertain the proposals of the Rome cabinet. Finally, however, in April, 1915, the Wilhelmstrasse and the Consulta reached an agreement, the terms on which Italy agreed to guarantee her neutrality to the Central Powers were committed to paper by Baron Sonnino, and on April 8 were formally submitted to the Central Powers.

THE ITALIAN NEUTRALITY TERMS

This document ran as follows:

Article I. Austria-Hungary cedes the Trentino to Italy with the frontiers which the Kingdom of Italy had in 1911—that is to say, after the Treaty of Paris of February 28, 1810.

Article II. A revision, in favor of Italy, will be made of her eastern frontier by including in the territory ceded the towns of Gradisca and Goritzia. The new frontier will separate from the present one at Troghofel, running toward the east at Osternig, whence it descends the Carnic Alps to Saifniz. Then, by the rising ground between Seisera and

Schliza, it remounts to the Wirsehberg, then again follows the present frontier to the Nevea Pass, and then descends the sides of the Rombone to Isonzo, passing to the east of Plazzo. Thence it follows the line of the Isonzo to Tolmino, where it leaves the Isonzo to follow a line more to the east, passing to the east of Pregona-Planina plateau and, following the hollow of the Chiappovano, descends to the east of Goritzia and, across the Carso de Comen, runs to the sea between Monfalcone and Trieste, near Nairesina.

Article III. The town of Trieste, with its environs, which will be extended on the north to Nairesina (inclusive) so as to touch the new Italian frontier (Art. II), and to the south in such a way as to include the present judiciary district of Capo d'Istria and Pirano, will be constituted as an autonomous and independent State, as far as concerns international, military, legislative, financial, and administrative affairs, Austria-Hungary renouncing all sovereignty over it. It shall remain a free port. Neither Austro-Hungarian nor Italian military forces shall enter it. It will take over its quota of the Austrian public debt, in proportion to its population.

Article IV. Austria-Hungary cedes to Italy the group of the Cursola Islands, including Lissa (with the adjacent islets of San Andrea and Busi) and Lesina (with the Spalmadores and the Torcola), Cursola, Lagosta (with the adjacent islets and reefs), Cazza, Melida, and Pelagosa.

Article V. Italy will occupy the ceded territories immediately. Trieste and its territories will be immediately evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian authorities and military forces. All the soldiers and sailors from the towns and territories ceded serving in the Austro-Hungarian army will be at once mustered out.

Article VI. Austria-Hungary recognizes the full sovereignty of Italy over the town and bay of Valona, in Albania, including the island of Sasseno, with, in the hinterland, such territory as is necessary for the defense of the territory held.

Article VII. Austria-Hungary will cease completely to take any interest in Albania as comprised within the limits assigned to it by the Conference of London.

Article VIII. Austria-Hungary will grant a complete amnesty to and will immediately liberate all persons sentenced for political or military offenses, who belong to the territory ceded (Arts. I, II, and IV) or evacuated (Art. III).

Article IX. Italy, for the liberation of the territories ceded and as the quota of the Austrian or Austro-Hungarian public debt and for the pensions payable to former imperial and royal functionaries and in exchange for the complete and immediate transfer to the Kingdom of Italy of all real and movable property, excepting arms, on the territories and in compensation for all the rights of the Austrian State on the said territories for the present and the future, will pay to Austria-Hungary a capital sum of 200,000,000 Italian lire in gold.

Article X. Italy undertakes to observe complete neutrality during the present war, so far as Austria-Hungary and Germany are concerned.

Article XI. During the whole duration of the present war, Italy renounces her right to invoke later in her favor the dispositions contained in Article 8 of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance, and Austria-Hungary makes the same renunciation as regards the Italian occupation of the Dodecanesus.

(Signed) SONNINO.

PRESSURE ON AUSTRIA

Prince Bulow and his government thought that they would be able to bring such pressure to bear on their Austrian ally that the Vienna Government would agree to these terms; but there was one point on which the Ballplatz remained adamant, and that was the immediate carrying out of the terms demanded by Italy. Austria was willing to subscribe to them, but on condition that their execution should be postponed till after the war. The point on which the long and painful negotiations finally shipwrecked was Italy's demand for the *immediate* military occupation of the territory ceded to her and the *immediate* evacuation by Austrian troops of the territory to be erected into the autonomous and independent State of Trieste.

THE BREAK IN NEGOTIATIONS

To this the Vienna Government absolutely refused to consent, while Baron Sonnino, on his side, declared that it was a *conditio sine qua non* of Italy's signature of a treaty of neutrality. All further negotiations were, therefore, broken off.

THE ALLIES' OPPORTUNITY

This was the opportunity of the Entente Powers. London, Paris, and Petrograd approached the Consulta and asked what it would demand as the price for coming into the war on the side of the Entente. In view of the offer Italy had just turned down, it was clear that the price would be high. The Entente statesmen were, however, not a little horrified when the Rome Government disclosed its conditions in all their nakedness. But the situation of the Allies was such that they were forced to pay almost any price to assure themselves of Italian support. As long as Italy was "on the fence," France had to keep at least 500,000 men to guard her southern frontier, and this at a moment when every soldier was worth his weight in gold.

As the Entente Powers regarded it as a life-and-death matter to get Italy into the war on their side, they accepted the Italian demands, and on April 26, 1915, the secret Treaty of London was signed, the signatories being, for Italy, the Marchese Imperiali, Italian Ambassador to the Court of St. James; for France, M. Cambon, the French Ambassador; for Russia, Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador, and for Great Britain, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

THE ALLIES' TREATY WITH ITALY

This treaty contained sixteen articles. Article I provided for the conclusion of a military convention between Italy and the Entente Powers, in which the minimum number of troops would be fixed which Russia would throw against Austria-Hungary in case the latter power should attempt to turn its full strength against Italy, and for a general understanding regarding military operations between the Entente belligerents. In Article II Italy pledged herself to throw her whole naval and military forces into the struggle. Article III provided that Italy should receive the district of the Trentino, the entire Southern Tyrol right up to the Brenner Pass, the

counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, the whole of Istria up to Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian Islands of Cherso and Lussina and a number of smaller islands.

Article V provided that Italy should be given the whole of the Province of Dalmatia, including Lissierica and Trebigne, in the north, and all the country to the south up to a line drawn from the coast at the promontory of Planka, eastward along the watershed, in such a way as to include in the Italian possessions all the valleys of the rivers flowing into the Sebenico, with all their affluents. Italy was further to receive all the islands to the north and west of the coast of Dalmatia.

It was further provided that all the Dalmatian coast not annexed by Italy from Planka, in the north, to the southern extremity of the Sabbioncello peninsula should be neutralized. This article was followed by a note which runs: "The following territories on the Adriatic will be included by the powers of the Quadruple Entente in Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro: In the north of the Adriatic, the entire coast from Volosca Bay, on the border of Istria, to the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the entire coast now belonging to Hungary, and the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume, and the smaller ports of Novi and Carlopago and also the islands of Veglia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Coli, and Arbe; and in the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Montenegro have interests, the entire coast from Planka up to the river Drin, with the chief ports of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, and San Giovanni di Medua, with the islands of Zirona Grande, Zirona Piccola, Bua, Solta, Brazza, Jakljan, and Calamotta."

Article VI provided that Italy should receive in absolute sovereignty, in Albania, the port of Valona, the island of Sasseno, and as much hinterland as would be required to assure their military safety.

By Article VII Italy, having received the Trentino and Istria, Dalmatia, and the Adriatic islands, as well as the Gulf of Valona, undertook, in case of the creation of a small and neutralized Albanian State, not to oppose the possible desire of France, Great Britain, and Russia to distribute among Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece the northern and southern parts of Albania.

Article VIII provides that Italy should obtain all the twelve islands (Dodecanese) now occupied by her in full possession.

Article IX declared that France, Great Britain, and Russia admit in principle the fact of Italy's interest in the maintenance of the political balance of power in the Mediterranean and her rights, in case of a partition of Turkey, to a share, equal to theirs, in the basin of the Mediterranean, viz., in that part of it which adjoins the Province of Adalia, in which Italy had already acquired special rights and interests, defined in the Italo-British Convention.

Article X declared that in Libya Italy was to enjoy all those rights and privileges which then belonged to the Sultan in virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne.

Article XI provided that Italy was to get a share in the war reparations corresponding to the magnitude of her sacrifices and efforts.

By Article XII Italy adhered to the declaration made by France, England, and Russia about leaving Arabia

and the Moslem holy places in the hands of an independent Moslem power.

Article XIII provided that should France and Great Britain extend their colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany they would admit in principle Italy's right to demand certain compensations by way of an extension of her possessions in Erythrea, Somaliland, and Libya and the colonial areas adjoining French and British possessions.

By Article XIV Great Britain undertook to facilitate for Italy the immediate flotation on the London market of a loan on advantageous terms, to the amount of at least £50,000,000.

By Article XV France, Great Britain, and Russia pledged themselves to support Italy in not allowing the representatives of the Holy See to undertake any diplomatic steps having as their object the conclusion of peace or the settlement of questions connected with the war.

Article XVI provided that the treaty should be kept secret, and Italy promised to intervene actively in the war at the earliest possible moment, and in any case not later than one month after the signature of the treaty.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON SERBIA

In light of subsequent events, this treaty seems a flagrant betrayal of one of the bravest and most loyal allies of the Entente, the Kingdom of Serbia. The carrying out of the secret treaty would indeed have been a terrible blow to the aspirations of Serbia and the southern Slavs for unity, as by its terms nearly a million of them would, without their consent being asked, have been transferred from the yoke of Austria to that of Italy.

What arguments, it may be asked, can be advanced in palliation of this apparent betrayal? As concerns Great Britain and France, the chief cause was probably ignorance and dire necessity. The World War had opened up so many and such vast problems that the statesmen of the Entente were not able to grasp them all. One of these was the aspiration for unity on the part of the various sections of the Serbo-Croatian race—that is to say, Serbia, Montenegro; and the Serbo-Croat provinces of the Austrian Empire (Bosnia, Herzegovina, Istria, Dalmatia, Slavonia, Carniola, Croatia, the Banat, and the Banat of Temesvar).

Of all the international questions raised by the war, the Yugoslav one was probably the furthest removed from the beaten tracks followed by European statesmen. The Polish question, *Italia irredenta*, the Danish duchies, Alsace-Lorraine, the future of Constantinople, and similar problems were more or less familiar and within the range of practical politics; but the study of the Yugoslav question had been confined to a few experts like Dr. Seton-Watson, Mr. Wickham Steed, and Sir Arthur Evans in England, and Prof. Denis M. Andre Chereadame, and M. Auguste Gauvain in France. But they were experts, and it is notorious that during the world conflict the men in power showed a curious disregard of expert advice and preferred to follow rule-of-thumb methods impressed upon them from day to day by the march of events.

In the case of the Marchese Imperiali there was no ignorance (no one knew the scope and extent of the advantages for Italy contained in the treaty better than the Italian Cabinet, whose mandatory he was), but there was, in 1915, a comprehension of Italian interests which explains, if it does not excuse, the drawing up of what seems, in the light of subsequent events, an iniquitous pact and one which Great Britain and France would later have been only too glad to repudiate, if they could have done so without breach of their plighted word.

In the case of the Russian plenipotentiary, there was, perhaps, less ignorance of the question at issue than there was in the case of his British and French colleagues, but there was undoubtedly the same constraint of dire necessity which forced the hands of Sir Edward Grey and M. Cambon.

IGNORANCE OF CONDITIONS

Another point which contributed to their short-sighted policy was their curious skepticism as to the ultimate break-up of the Austrian Empire. The statesmen in Vienna had balanced successfully on the tight rope for so long that they were credited with being able to continue the performance indefinitely. The idea that the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Rumanians, the Italians, and the Southern Slavs could break away completely from Austria, either forming new States or joining others already in existence, was not realized by the statesmen of the Entente till nearly the end of the war. And if they knew little, the peoples at large knew still less. The result was that there was no force of public to check the arbitrary course of the men in power. These nearly all belonged to the old school of diplomacy, which was accustomed to assembling around a board of green cloth and to shuffling the smaller and subject races about without consulting them in any way, as the pawns on the European chessboard. The Southern Slavs, they argued, were subjects of Austria, an autocratic and reactionary empire. Italy was a free and enlightened democracy; therefore the transfer of the Southern Slavs from the rule of the Emperor Francis Joseph to that of King Victor Emmanuel was, in the opinion of the Entente, all to their advantage. Any protest on their part would be base ingratitude toward their protectors. In 1915 President Wilson had not yet enunciated the freedom-giving principle of the self-determination of peoples.

The argument of the British, French, and Russian statesmen was, therefore, "If we cannot bring Italy in on our side, we may lose the war. If we lose the war, the Southern Slavs will remain forever under the yoke of their Austrian taskmasters. If we, by granting Italy's demands, bring her in on our side and win the war, the Southern Slavs will be incorporated in a free and democratic State like Italy. It is true they might, and doubtless would, prefer to join with their brothers-in-race of Serbia and Montenegro and form an independent Yugoslav State, but this is at present a Utopia, and the times are too critical for us to waste time on dreams that cannot be realized. They must understand that 'a half loaf is better than no bread,' and let us, the Great Powers, in our wisdom, settle their destiny."

This, of course, was a purely unjustified conception of the problem of the Austrian Empire. A little study would soon have convinced the Entente statesmen of their complete error. They would have found that the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak aspirations were a tremendous force and one with which the whole world would have to reckon. They did not realize that, to quote Joseph le Maistre, "*une aspiration Slave fera sauter une forteresse*," and that when twenty-odd million Austrian Slavs had declared for independence, no questions of policy or opportunity put forward by the so-called Great Powers would make them consent to become subject to any power against their will.

Besides, Britain, France, and Russia could not plead *entire* ignorance of Yugoslav aspirations, for these, a few days before the signing of the secret treaty, were voiced with no uncertain sound in the Serbian Parliament by M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister.

ANXIETY IN SERBIA

In spite of the confidential nature of the negotiations regarding the secret treaty, rumors had begun to circulate and had caused a certain amount of anxiety in Serbia. On April 15, eleven days before it was signed, M. Dregoliub Pavlovitch, a member of the Skupchtina, addressed the following question to the government:

"In the foreign press and in our own, rumors are obstinately in circulation concerning an early action on the part of Italy. This action is to be determined by certain compensations. These are again to be made at the expense of the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovene peoples. I ask the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister if these rumors correspond to the truth."

In reply to this interpellation, M. Pashitch made the following declaration:

"All I can say for the present in reply to the question of M. Pavlovitch is the following: It is true that rumors have reached us from various sides of *pourparlers* that have been begun between Italy and the powers of the Triple Entente for the participation of the former alongside the latter in the solution of the various questions. As before, rumors have been current that *pourparlers* have also been begun between Italy and Germany and Austria regarding the concessions which Italy could obtain by remaining associated with Germany and Austria. These rumors are not confirmed officially. This is why we cannot know whether or not they correspond to the truth; for it often happens that false rumors are spread with a view of bringing about declarations and of sounding the opinions and sentiments in certain quarters.

"For the moment I cannot put faith in these rumors or believe that they correspond to the truth, for I do not believe that Italy will violate the principles in the name of which she realized her own unity. I do not think she will abandon these just principles at the time we are seeking the solution of the problem of nationalities.

"Italy achieved her unity on the basis of the principle of nationalities. All her juridical science leads up to the inviolable postulate that the State must maintain and respect the principle on which it is founded. If it abandons it, it

shakes its own foundations. This is why I think that Italy, in ranging herself alongside the Triple Entente, will be guided by the principle of nationalities, and that she will be able to arrange her interests in the Adriatic in such a way that there will be no regrettable consequences either for her or for us, and that there will not be a disaccord between the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and the Italians; for it is only an accord between these two peoples that would furnish the surest guarantee against the 'push' of Germany toward the Mediterranean.

"In Italy there are great political men whose wisdom is able to appreciate the importance of an accord between the Serb-Croat-Slovene people and Italy, an accord which alone can assure the prosperity of the two peoples by increasing their mutual friendship and by assuring the communications between them for the development of their commerce. This is why, gentlemen, I think that the Italian statesmen will not be guided by the idea of obtaining a town or an island more or less. They must know in advance that Italy's force does not lie in this or that town or island, but in the friendly relations between her and the Serb-Croat-Slovene people."

These friendly and statesmanlike utterances of M. Pashitch found, however, no echo in Rome, nor in the capitals of the Entente Powers, and did not prevent the signing of a treaty which bartered away the freedom of nearly a million Jugoslavs.

THE ITALIAN POSITION

If want of knowledge cannot be invoked on the part of Italian statesmen, what arguments, it will be asked, can be put forward by them in justification of the terms of the secret treaty? The answer is: Reasons of strategy and the necessity of assuring the safety of Italy in the future. In 1915 Italy had to consider two possibilities regarding the final issue of the war: One was that it would end in a drawn battle, a kind of political stalemate, as the result of which Germany and Austria would still remain in being as Great Powers and still be a future menace to Italy. In these circumstances it was to Italy's interest, and it was even her duty, to assure herself of every possible strategic advantage, so that if she had ever to renew the struggle against Austria she would do so with as many trump cards in hand as possible. If the Austrian Empire still continued to exist, no free and independent Yugoslavia could come into being; so that Italy's annexations could not harm a State that was non-existent.

The second hypothesis was that Austria should be defeated and dismembered, and that Russia should exist as the greatest military and autocratic power in Europe. She would naturally establish herself as the protector of all the smaller Slav nations. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia would, therefore, only be outposts of the Russian Empire, and the menace of Pan-Slavism would replace the menace of Pan-Germanism on the Adriatic and elsewhere. By the secret treaty entered into by France, Great Britain, and Russia before the war, the latter power was assured the possession of Constantinople and the Dardanelles; so that, as the Black Sea fleet could enter the Ægean at any time, Russia might become a formidable rival to Italy in the Mediterranean.

Through Yugoslavia she could challenge Italy's mastery of the Adriatic, and from the Croatian and Dalmatian ports could threaten Italy's Adriatic coast line.

Such a danger might be an excuse, if not a reason, for Italy's claim to Istria, Dalmatia, and the islands. In 1915 the realization of either of these hypotheses was possible and could be pleaded in justification of the terms of the secret treaty.

THE 1919 SITUATION

But in 1919 no such reason could be invoked. The Austrian Empire had ceased to exist, and Russia as a military and autocratic power had disappeared forever from the political stage. The new State of Yugoslavia had come into existence, but could not be a menace to Italy or challenge her naval supremacy in the Adriatic. The new kingdom did not possess a navy, and it was in the power of the Great Powers to stipulate that she should not create one. A country may raise an army in secret, but can never create a fleet without its becoming known. With the possession by Italy of Brindisi and Valona, Trieste and Venice, the Adriatic, from the point of view of naval strategy, became an Italian lake.

There was, therefore, no reason whatever why Italy should insist upon receiving the strategic guarantees contained in the secret treaty. Great Britain and France realized too late the bitter injustice they had done to their gallant ally, Serbia, the "Piedmont" of the new Yugoslavia, by signing the secret treaty; but as long as Italy insisted on her pound of flesh, they did not know of any way of escaping from the dilemma in which they had placed themselves. The only solution would be that Italy should voluntarily renounce the terms of the secret treaty and thus set them free from the obligations it imposed upon them.

Such was the situation at the moment of the assembling of the Peace Conference in Paris. It was soon seen that Italy had no intention of allowing the Treaty of London to be abrogated. On the contrary, she even went beyond that document and claimed Fiume, to which in the treaty she had renounced all claim, categorically admitting that it was a Croatian port. In addition, in order to still further assure her supremacy in the Adriatic, Italy had proclaimed a protectorate over Albania and occupied the port of Valona, the southern harbor of that country. This was her Gibraltar in the Adriatic. As long as she held it and the port of Brindisi, one of her chief naval bases, the Adriatic became practically a *mare clausum*, an Italian lake.

THE FIUME CLAIMS

It is difficult to understand on what the claims of Italy to Fiume are based. The city never at any time belonged to Italy. For a very short period in the 16th century the Republic of Venice established a sort of authority there, but it was of very short duration. The city and port were undoubtedly Croatian. One of the main grounds for Italy's claim to Fiume was that a majority of the inhabitants are Italian-speaking. Even if this were so, it would prove nothing, as the greater part of them are immigrants. And when did immigration ever confer rights on the country from which the

immigrants come? If this principle was admitted, Italy could claim possession of the east side of New York.

In 1852 the total number of Italians in Fiume was 651. Four years later they had increased to 4,000. Such an increase could only be accounted for by immigration. The construction of the port and railroad, the establishment of the Whitehead Torpedo factory, the construction and exploiting of the immense government tobacco manufactory, and other important works brought a fresh influx of Italian labor until, in 1910, one of a total population of 40,000, about 26,000 were Italian-speaking. But the section known as Fiume is only a part of the whole city, which is made up of two sections, Fiume and Shushak, which are as closely connected as Washington and Georgetown or New York and Brooklyn. Of the 20,000 inhabitants of the Shushak section, only about 600 are Italian-speaking, so that out of the total population of 60,000 in Fiume-Shushak, 26,000 are Italian-speaking, while 34,000 are Yugoslavs.

The situation in Paris, as far as the Adriatic question was concerned, was, therefore, rather a curious one. Great Britain and France, having signed the secret treaty, had their hands tied. Of course, under the treaty they could have resisted Italy's claim to Fiume, but only by admitting the validity of the other claims. But Yugoslavia, not having been a party to the treaty and not even having been consulted as to its terms, naturally repudiated it and refused to recognize a document which deprived her of 90 per cent of her seaboard and handed a million Yugoslavs to a foreign dominion.

As she could, under the circumstances, expect no aid from France or Great Britain, the Belgrade Government naturally turned to the United States as the only other Great Power which came into the Conference with its hands free. President Wilson, after a prolonged study of the question, decided in favor of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and declared that Fiume was a Croatian and not an Italian city.

THE FIUME DEADLOCK

As, however, the Italian Government refused to accept this ruling, the situation became one of deadlock, and at the conclusion of the labors of the conference was still undecided. The only solution that the powers could suggest was that Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes should settle the dispute by means of direct negotiations. These had hardly begun when a fresh and most serious complication arose, which greatly envenomed an already critical situation. On September 17, 1919, Captain Gabrielle D'Annunzio, at the head of a considerable body of troops, seized the city of Fiume and declared its annexation to Italy. This action on his part, though it must have been made with the knowledge of a section of the military authorities, undoubtedly took the Nitti Government by surprise. It officially repudiated the action of Captain D'Annunzio and promised that the *status quo ante* would be restored. The Belgrade Government showed admirable patience and self-control and did nothing on its side to further embarrass the Rome Cabinet. It recognized the serious nature of the internal situation in Italy, in which revolutionary forces were actively at work.

Some time later Signor Giolitti succeeded Signor Nitti as premier. Bit by bit the public excitement in Italy died down, while D'Annunzio found it increasingly difficult to maintain himself and his forces in Fiume. The conditions in that city were desperate. For months no vessel had entered the port, and the population was reduced to something approaching starvation. It was clear that such a situation could not last. Signor Giolitti proposed that a conference should be held at the little town of Rapallo, near Genoa, to discuss a final settlement. This time the effort was successful, and the Treaty of Rapallo was signed in April, 1920. It cannot be claimed that this document excited any enthusiasm, either in Italy or Yugoslavia. It was, as is usual in such cases, a compromise. Italy withdrew her claims to the possession of Dalmatia with the exception of the little town of Zara. Fiume became neither Yugoslav nor Italian, but was made into a free and autonomous State. In Istria Yugoslavia had to sacrifice a large amount of territory inhabited by her nationals and had to make similar sacrifices up toward the Trentino.

But the two governments felt that a strained and critical situation had to be got rid of at any price if more disastrous results were not to follow. So far the Treaty of Rapallo has not been carried out in its entirety, owing to a fresh incursion into Fiume of D'Annunzio's legionaries, but these have been solemnly repudiated by the Rome Government, which assures the Belgrade Cabinet of its firm resolve to carry out the full terms of the treaty.

The Belgrade Government again showed the greatest patience under this fresh aggression of the *fascisti* and contented itself with a note of protest to the powers, but at the same time expressed its confidence that the Italian Government would not fail to carry out loyally the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo.

THE ALBANIAN STORM CENTER

The only other storm center in the Adriatic is Albania. Up to eighteen months ago, Italy, as I have said, maintained a protectorate over that country. In addition to Valona, Italian garrisons occupied Durazzo, El Basan, Tirana, Scutari, and other strategic points. This protectorate was self-imposed and never received the approval of the other powers, least of all Yugoslavia and Greece. It further excited no enthusiasm among the Albanians themselves, with the result that the Italian authorities were soon face to face with a general Albanian revolt. Many of the isolated Italian garrisons were so hard pressed that they had to evacuate their positions and only reached Valona with the greatest difficulty. The whole Albanian policy of the government was extremely unpopular with the labor elements in Italy and excited the liveliest opposition from the Socialists in the Italian Parliament. So violent did this opposition become that it culminated in a mutiny of certain regiments under orders for service in Albania.

The government found itself in a dilemma. If the military forces in Albania were not reinforced, it would not be possible to hold the country and maintain the protectorate. If, through want of reinforcements, there should be a military disaster in Albania, the repercus-

sion on the home situation might be equally disastrous. The government therefore resolved to abandon its Albanian policy while yet there was time, and negotiated the withdrawal of the Italian with the provisional Albanian Government installed at Tirana. The Italians even consented to evacuate Valona, keeping only, as a naval base, the island of Sasseno.

The new Albanian Government seemed at first to have the situation in hand. It applied for and received recognition from the Council of the League of Nations and was admitted to membership in that body. But very soon the turbulent character of the population came to the front. A strong opposition formed among the Mirdites and challenged the authority of the Government of Tirana. At the same time the border tribes came into armed conflict with the Serbian troops guarding the frontier. There was a series of clashes, and both sides appealed to the League of Nations. The Belgrade Government further insisted that the long-delayed delimitation of the Serbo-Albanian frontier should be carried out without further loss of time. A delimitation commission was sent out, but before it could complete its labors the Government of Tirana was swept out of existence by the revolting tribes.

In order to prevent the country falling into complete anarchy, the League of Nations, on June 12, decided that it would itself take over the administration of Albania. If this should prove successful and if all causes of friction between Italy and Yugoslavia can be removed by the loyal fulfillment of the terms of the Treaty of Rapallo, the question of the Adriatic will be in a fair way to settlement and may eventually be consigned to the limbo of things that were.

There is no doubt that it is to the interest of Italy, Yugoslavia, and Albania that such a settlement should be reached. The continual "alarms and incursions" of the past three years have hampered the development of all three countries and postponed the return to normal conditions. Every impartial student of politics in the southeastern section of Europe sees that Italy has every reason for being the friend and ally of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and not a single valid reason for conflict with that State. Unfortunately, racial dislikes and prejudices are hard to eradicate, and have often been handed down from generation to generation without the heirs of this *damnosa hereditas* understanding clearly the origin and causes of their quarrel.

"The book of race migrations must be closed forever. It is for an informed and sensible public opinion to put a stop to permitted invasions. The peace of the world cannot be assured until some effective check is placed upon wars for land or the products of land; the prosperity of the world cannot be assured until there is a general denial of the right of any nation with an excessive increase of population to seek relief by sending its surplus nationals abroad. We have lately heard a good deal about the right of self-determination of peoples. It is time to assert the *duty* of self-determination. Each nation must be compelled to work out its own population problems without threatening the well-being of other nations that are more intelligent or more self-controlled."—From "The End of Racial Migrations," by Henry Pratt Fairchild, *The Yale Review*, July, 1922.

THE FINALE AT GENOA

In the May issue of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE* the proceedings of the Genoa Conference were outlined up to the delivery of the Allied proposals to Russia, on May 2, or, rather, early in the morning of May 3. That turned out to be the eleventh hour of the conference.

Late on May 3 the Russians indicated they were not pleased with the proposals, although, as will be recalled, they had been so softened that Belgium had refused to sign, and France had said she would have to be authorized from Paris to do so, the delegations from both of these countries being strongly in favor of return of property confiscated by the Soviet Government, instead of return or recompense. The displeasure of the Russians, according to the Associated Press, was due to the lack of attention to recognition and a loan, in the proposals as submitted.

CONFERENCE IN HAZE

Conditions drifted in hazy fashion for about one week, with the wires bringing to this country indications that the conference was about to reach its end. On May 11 the Russians acted and virtually closed the conference. They replied to the Allied proposals in characteristic fashion, offering extended argument on subjects long debated previously and supposedly removed from the realm of discussion at the conference. But at the same time, being pressed by their necessities to make terms with the Western nations if possible, they proposed a mixed commission to meet later and continue the study of the relationship, present and future, of Russia to the balance of Europe. The Russian proposal was counted conciliatory by Mr. Lloyd-George and those working with him.

THE HAGUE PLAN

Out of that proposal grew the plan to hold at The Hague, beginning the middle of this month, the sessions of an international commission to thresh out the Russian situation and make recommendations. That is the net of the concentration of the major nations, upon the Russian problem during virtually the entire Genoa session. The other principal project in Mr. Lloyd-George's mind—that is, the 10-year European truce, modeled somewhat after the 10-year naval holiday effectuated at the Washington Conference—was not carried into execution, but an eight-month truce was arranged, which, it is hoped, will lead to a permanent arrangement of long duration. For the rest, the Genoa Conference was marked only by the completion of the Russo-German treaty and by the recommendations of the commissions dealing with finance, economics, and transport.

When the overshadowing Russian question was definitely moved to The Hague, the decision being announced on May 14 and the Genoa Conference adjourning on May 19, strenuous efforts were made to have the United States participate. France was active in these efforts, since there was a certain likeness in the position of the United States, France and Belgium, and on May 13, according to Genoa dispatches, her delegates approached this government through Richard Washburn Child, American Ambassador to Italy, who had acted as observer at Genoa. Unfortunately, some misunderstanding arose, and for a time the impression prevailed at Genoa that the United States would be at The Hague.